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-- " 
It is possible to detect two intertwined arguments in the many 
compl aint s about lack of effectiveness or "failures" of techn i cal 
assistance programs. The first is that the major U.S. donor, USAID, 
has a cumbersome structure that ha s evolved to serve only bureacratic 
ends (3). The second is that we have not learned how to do the job (2). 
Of course donor agencies have their problems and I have recently helped 
to take a stab at delineating some of them (6). Also, it is always 
possible to learn and improve (even though it is my opinion that we already 
have quite a bit of adequate technical expertise to callan). A third 
(t '-'tf 
argument, one that bears repeat"jng _~llit a lot more emphasis, "is the subject 
of my paper: the major reason for lack of technical assistance effective-
ness is found in a complex of factors for which receipient nations must 
bear much of the responsibility. 
These range from a shortage of human capital and a weak scientific 
base to an unwill in gness to admit mistakes, fr om inadequate salary scales 
to hamstringing idealogical biases. In case after case , T. A. programs 
of large size are forced to operate within existing host government public 
sector institutions which are notoriously inefficient and immature. 
p 
The situation is ac erbated by the quantity of development money, projects 
and programs being thrust onto 3rd world countries. This has reached the 
point where not just 10 or even 20, but as much as 30 agricultural missions 
are trying to operate in one country simultaneously! Given the weak ad-
ministrative environmen ts, the resultant stumbling around is virtually 
unmanageable. I don't seriously expect 3rd wor l d governments to turn money 
down but it is interesting to nof<how efficient they are at kE~eping the loans 
1 
and grants rolling in. Donors are being pl ayed against each other in order 
2. 
to maximize concessionary terms and arrang ements. And once the contracts 
or agreements are assured, the object often is to neutral i ze the pres ence of 
any foreign technicians assigned to the programs. Unfortunately, this type 
of efficiency simply leads t o an ever increasing ap pea rance of great activ-
ity without commensurate measurable progress. 
Meanwhi le the 3rd world complains about everything from international 
trade patterns t o cultural oppression. Some of this is legitimate, some 
of it is extreme. There seems to be a 3rd world sentiment, made very obvious 
by the recent food conferences, that the developed nations to a large degree 
should hold themselves responsible fo r t he food and welfa r e of t he underdev-
eloped. This sentiment has made eno ugh of an impression t hat, in Canada for 
example, there has since been public debate over an agricultural policy 
involving a moral obligation to feed the wor ld. And while the U.S. has not 
gone that far, the way we treat foreig n aid recipients has many elements of 
some kind of giant affirmative action prog ram . It seems we are willing to put 
up with an awfu l lot to minimize accusations of being unfriendly, unfair, 
unfeeling or cold hearted. Poor nations certainly have problems and it may 
be that our country can help alleviate them, but we are not helping them 
or ourselves by taking some of their lack of development arguments too 
seri ously, as seems to be the case when we finance unsound and weak programs 
or even encourage host governments to invent new ones. 
This cannot help but have negative impacts. In the first place, the 
amounts of just U.S money involved are so large in some cases that they 
must lead to charges of neo-colonialism and , what may be even worse, these 
countries are getting the imp res sion that they can obtain deve -]opment from 
t he "outside." This simply is not possible--dev~lopment cannot be pur-
3. 
chased, even at someone else1s expense . Measured purely in T. A. terms, 
the amount of time and energy that has already been spent in the last 25 
years, with uneven effect, is evidence that they have shirked the task. 
Now time is running out. At the very moment we are beinq warned about 
potential food shortages, Leontiff (only one example) has estimated a 25 
year limit on continued global economic growth at present rates. Th is 
means that various 3rd world countries need to find out what their opt ions 
really are and make as many adjustments as possible before th2Y have even 
more constraints to deal with. 
At a recent conference on managing rural development at l~cGill Univer-
sity, a young '",oman from Senegal told a panel of "experts" th:lt fore"gn dono rs 
and technicians had an obligation to "un derstand fl her people 3nd their national 
aspirations. My answer to her was that, altho ugh sympathetic to her point 
of view, 25 years had passed since Point 4 began and I did not have the time. 
When she was ready to go to work we might get together, meanwhile I woul d go 
elsewhere. My response made things a little tense. Actually it should have 
been stronger: the greatest single contributo r to the resources drain connect-
ed vlith a quarter century of T. A. effort is that developing countries have 
been allowed to waste the time and talent of technicians from ma ny lands, not 
just the U.S. 
Virtually every recipient nation has the resource base to greatly in-
crease the effectiveness of its T. A. utilization. But this is being ignored 
and in extreme cases T. A. is simply treated as a free good. 
This raises the question of the degree to which some countries are 
),.. really cOfl111itted to scientific endeavor, even though they appear to have a 
primitive faith that technology is going to solve their development problems. 
4. 
Do their leaders believe that t hey, themselves, will not have to master a 
basic minimum of production and control processes t o guide th (;ir own futures? 
How long can the common people l ive with t he uncoordinated, unscientific, 
L-
and va~illating programming that eminates from the middle and upper levels 
of their public sector officials? Unless this syndrome is broken by some 
combination of better trained, dedicated people, hewing to achievable goals, 
there is little hope of making progress before ecological or other limiting 
forces close off available options. Therefore if development progress is 
genuinly desired, failure to face up to administrative i;~foFll requirements 
may be the single most important constraint to effective technical assistance. 
Recognition of these interlocking pressures calls for replacing the 
U.S. "affirmative action" stance with a tougher approach in which T. A. pre-
conditions are effectively imposed. The minimum conditions s~ould be a 
demonstrated commitment to human capital development and public instituion 
* reform supported in some instances by population controls. 
Not everyone will like a tougher approach, and U.S. officials have told 
In eon mo ret han 0 n e 0 c cas ion t hat " We can' t i mp 0 s e 0 u r will 0 n a no the r co u n try. " 
This argument is hard to swallow. The State Department is not afraid to impose 
preconditions in other connections, for example in the Carter Administration's 
approach to human rights. At the opening of a two-day national foreign policy 
conference on human rights, Deputy Secretary of State, Mr. Warren Christopher, 
is reported as saying: "Both economic and military assistance are governed 
in part by human rights with more aid going to Icountries with a high regard 
* There is a kind of half-way house which might be a substitute for 
pre - con C\.t ion sin c e r t a i n (r e sea r c h) pro g ram S 0 r s p e cia 1 sit u a t ion s . T his 
is to vest in the foreign technicians virtual control over the program 
and the resources involved. 
5. 
for hu man rights. I Those with what he called a poor reco rd have fa ced 
restrictions, deferred bilateral aid and U,S . opposition to loans from 
international agenci es like the Wor l d Rank.fI(4) 
Where necessary, th erefore, it seems to me that nat ions coul d be 
ask ed to adhere to certai n preconditions i n order to benefit fr om the 
cost, time and effort of persons and natio ns delivering techn -ical assistance . 
Many other donor nations impose something similar to precondtions in that 
they are fairly careful about what they will or will not do i n T. A. effort---
th ey speciali ze or pick politically neutral programs. Finally, I am not alone 
in suggesting pre-conditions. Dr. Paddock (and others ) has recently urged 
dropping all forms of aid to countries without effective population controls (2). 
Once pre-condition s are met, we do not want to be caught short by lacking 
a route to follow. Here is where as taxpayers and concerned ci tizens, it 
seems Congress and USAID need to hear some suggestions. 
USAID and other DONOR countri es and agencies should s tO J acting as if 
th ey are hungry for contracts or programs . In the case of USAI D, project 
managers are so dedicated to emptying the pipeline t hat it is ittle wonder 
that recipent not io ns have a false impression of what will be achieved at low 
cost to themselves and possibly at little or no obligation . Some type of 
\ 
in te rnational cl earing house for donors workin g in any given -ountry ought 
to be set up outside the borders and beyond that rea ch of the host country 
Bureaucracy. 
In other words all the donors must r ethink what it i s they are trying 
to do -- for example, are they pushing welfare. output or what? Is the spectre 
of a world food shortage real or not? Wi ll the current emphasis on the 
poorest of the poor make natio ns self-suffici ent or no t ? What is the best way 
to increase food output? 
6. 
It seems to me that the poor of this world, now and for t e future, can-
not really expect to benefit from economic growth rates as high or higher 
* .. 
than people now living have experienced. This i s because sig ifican t econ-
omic improvement would require an amount of global growth that is limited 
by the environment and possibly by society i tse lf. Of all the potential 
"bads 'l that such limits will impose on underdeveloped areas, I will concen-
trate on food shortage. 
As of this date USAID has a 25-year history in the T. A. game · , but 
probably does not have the internal resources to take on anything that could 
be called a world food problem. Many of the original and most experineced 
staff have either retired or are about to. Less than 18% of the staff are 
classed as technic an s and only 3% as agriculturalists (4). In addition, as 
far as increasing world food production is concerned, the "small farmer 
** mandate" is a millstone. The mandate might lead to programs that would 
improve the welfare of rural families to some degree, but marginal farmers 
*** could never be the backbone of production to feed lots of other people. 
*There is a possibility for a certain amount of re-shuffling-- some will 
do better than others--and for this reason as well as that abs)lute growth 
will not stop, better managerial ability and processes will sti"ll be needed 
(to ferret out and exploit various options). 
** Of course there are "other "millstones" from a U.S. Operating Mission 
point of view: Role of Women in Development, Concern for the Environment, etc. 
*** .' F 1 The mandate is self-d~structive in any case. If lt lS S ccess · u , 
especially in helping farmers increase output, unless the increase can be 
sold, prices will fall, and the least efficient (poorest of the poor) farmers 
will be destroyed. 
7. 
Therefore, if USAID chooses to gird up for what may be th~ important 
battle from the standpoint of the majority of the world's people, the 
Agency will have to create a whole new staff profile and a completely new 
and different way of selecting projects and countries in which to work 
(the best places to solve food shortages may not be in the poorest countries). 
Any success in a world food battle would require much more emphasis on 
heavily research oriented programs than USAID has liked to fund in the 
past. Unless the Agency could see a way out via support for the Inter-
national Centers, current anti-research attitudes would have to change. 
At the present moment USAID is being restructured (again). If the 
Humphrey Bill passes the Agency will be removed from the State Department, 
but will continue to have a large complex of "development functions" assigned. 
Nothing is the Bill suggests that T. A. will be singled out for special 
consideration or that it will be separated from political maneuvering" so 
I suggest some emphasis on food production as a substitute for such over-
sight, in the hope that this would make the reorganization a little more 
historic. 
Finally, the reorganization would be especially historic if the new 
AID would say to one and all, "We are serious about our T. A. dollars and 
they are reserved for those nations that have demonstrated a commitment to 
use them effectively." As my friend Keith Roberts observed in this connection, 
"You can't put new wine in old bottles." So while the donor ndtions ought 
to take a good look at the wine they are ferm~nting, it's largely up to 
recipient nations to provide the new bottles. 
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